When a patient settles his claim against one wrongdoer during his lifetime and then dies, his family may want to pursue a hospital that also contributed. Ritchie v The Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2026] EWCC 50 shows that the claim fails where the in-life settlement gave him full satisfaction, and how much the procedural route by which the claim ends matters for costs under qualified one-way costs shifting (QOCS).

Quick answer

A settlement with one concurrent tortfeasor ends the claim against another where it gave the injured person full satisfaction for the same harm, and full satisfaction is not the same as full value. Where the deceased settled in life on that basis, his dependants have no claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. In Ritchie the court entered summary judgment rather than striking the claim out. That matters because a strike-out on the grounds in CPR 44.15 lets the defendant enforce its costs in full without permission, while summary judgment leaves the claimant’s QOCS protection in place.

What happened in Ritchie?

In March 2015 Brian Ritchie had heart valve surgery at the trust’s hospital, during which he is believed to have contracted a Mycobacterium chimaera infection from a contaminated heater-cooler unit. The judgment does not name the manufacturer, and neither do we. He became unwell from around 2018 and was diagnosed after samples taken during surgery in July 2021 grew the organism (at [3]–[4]).

His solicitor advanced a product liability claim against the manufacturer. After an interim payment of £25,000, a schedule of loss for £346,963.79 was served in May 2022, including general damages, care, a seven-year reduction in life expectancy and a lost years claim. The claim settled in August 2022 for £250,000 plus £20,000 costs, under an agreement expressed to be in full and final settlement and releasing any claim against the manufacturer, including under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 or the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. It reserved the manufacturer’s right to pursue third parties, with no equivalent reservation for Mr Ritchie or his family (at [5]–[11], [21]).

Mr Ritchie died in October 2022. After the inquest, his widow sued the trust under the Fatal Accidents Act, alleging that its failings had cost him two years of life and delayed relief of his suffering. She claimed £35,214.95 for bereavement, funeral expenses and financial dependency. The trust applied to strike the claim out or, alternatively, for summary judgment (at [12]–[17]).

Why the claim failed: full satisfaction

Section 1(1) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 gives dependants a claim only where the deceased could have maintained an action and recovered damages against the defendant had he lived (at [26] and [52]). HHJ Grimshaw held that he was bound by Thompson v Arnold [2007] EWHC 1875 (QB), which applied the rule in Read v Great Eastern Railway (1868) LR 3 QB 555: where an injured person pursues a claim to settlement or judgment in life, his dependants have no action under the Act after his death (at [25]–[29], [55]). Under Jameson v Central Electricity Generating Board [2000] 1 AC 455 and Heaton v AXA Equity & Law Assurance Society plc [2002] 2 AC 329, a settlement with one concurrent tortfeasor does not automatically release another, but it does where it gave full satisfaction for the harm. The court looks at the terms of the agreement in its factual context; it does not revalue the claim to see whether a judge would have awarded more (at [34]–[35], [40] and [57]).

Taking the widow’s case at its highest, the judge found full satisfaction (at [64] and [68]–[69]):

  • The claim against the manufacturer covered every loss recoverable in life, over the whole period from 2018. The trust’s alleged failings caused no new injury; they were said to have failed to relieve suffering caused by the infection, which the claim against the manufacturer had already covered.
  • The schedule pleaded a seven-year reduction in life expectancy and a lost years claim. The two years now alleged fell within it, and the lost years claim appears to have been pleaded more generously than the dependency claim now advanced.
  • The agreement excluded any further claim against the manufacturer under the Fatal Accidents Act or the 1934 Act, indicating that Mr Ritchie appreciated no further claim could be brought against it after his death, and suggesting that the settlement was intended to compensate him for all of his losses.
  • Settling at about 72% of the schedule did not mean the claim was unsatisfied. Several heads had been pleaded optimistically and would have been reduced at trial, and otherwise a claimant could plead an inflated schedule and use the shortfall to pursue other tortfeasors.

The bar applies to the same damage (at [59]), which here means the infection itself, not a particular head of loss: although the widow claimed losses that arise only in fatal accident cases, the bereavement and funeral claims failed with the dependency claim (at [68]–[69]).

The judge also rejected the argument that the family knew nothing of the trust’s possible failings before Mr Ritchie died; on the widow’s own evidence they had concerns about his care during his lifetime (at [65]–[67]). He distinguished Wright v Barts Health NHS Trust [2016] EWHC 1834 (QB) and Appleby v Northern Devon Healthcare NHS Trust [2012] EWHC 4356 (QB), where the earlier settlements had been made at a substantial discount: in Wright for contributory negligence, and in Appleby a discount thought to exceed 50% (at [41]–[42]).

The costs point: strike-out or summary judgment?

The Fatal Accidents Act claim was within QOCS (CPR 44.13(1)(b)). Under CPR 44.14, orders for costs against a claimant can be enforced without permission only up to the aggregate of the damages, interest and costs ordered or agreed in the claimant’s favour. CPR 44.15 removes that limit, without any need for permission, where the proceedings have been struck out on the grounds that the claimant disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing them, that they are an abuse of the court’s process, or that the conduct of the claimant, or of someone acting for the claimant with the claimant’s knowledge of that conduct, is likely to obstruct their just disposal. Summary judgment is not a strike-out, so CPR 44.15 does not apply to it.

The trust asked for strike-out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) or (b), or alternatively summary judgment. The judge spelled out the difference: strike the claim out, and the trust could enforce its costs against the widow; enter summary judgment, and she would be liable for those costs but the trust could not enforce them (at [72]). He added that the court should not decide at that stage whether a claimant deserves costs protection; the question is which disposal is more appropriate (at [73]).

He chose summary judgment. The claim disclosed a cause of action recognised in law and a reasonable ground for bringing it if the widow had been right about full satisfaction; it was not the kind of claim described in paragraph 1.2 of Practice Direction 3A, and the problem was not a deficiency in the pleading. It failed because an essential element of the cause of action was missing, so it had no real prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason for a trial (CPR 24.3; at [73] and [75]).

What it means for clinical negligence firms

  • Check every earlier settlement. Where a death follows an in-life settlement with another party, such as a product manufacturer, the dependency claim against a hospital may already be extinguished. The terms of that agreement, read in context, decide it. A shortfall against the pleaded schedule does not by itself show that the claim was unsatisfied (at [68]), though a settlement at a substantial discount, for example for contributory negligence, may not be full satisfaction (at [41]–[42]).
  • Settlement wording matters. Following Heaton, an indication in the agreement, express or implied, that the claimant envisages further proceedings against another wrongdoer is a pointer, no more, against full satisfaction (at [40]). In Ritchie the only reservation was the manufacturer’s own right to pursue third parties (at [21]).
  • Advise dying clients on timing. The court noted that a claim cannot be pursued both in life and after death, and that Thompson sets out ways to protect the dependants’ position, such as an interim payment combined with an adjournment (at [27] and [55]).
  • Mind the route to the costs order. If an application to dispose of the claim is likely to succeed, the argument over strike-out or summary judgment decides whether the defendant can enforce its costs in full without permission, or only within the QOCS limit.

For the QOCS rules in brief, see the legal costs glossary.

What Ritchie does not decide

  • Whether the trust was negligent. For the application the court proceeded on the basis that liability could be established (at [62]).
  • Whether Read and Thompson are right. The widow argued that the Act is unfair to dependants who cannot recover a bereavement award after an in-life settlement they were not party to; the judge was bound by the authorities, said the argument was not a matter for his court, and in any event saw great force in Langstaff J’s reasoning (at [53] and [56]).
  • What happens where an earlier settlement was made at a substantial discount, as in Wright (for contributory negligence) and Appleby (a discount thought to exceed 50%). There may then be no full satisfaction (at [41]–[42]).
  • It is a County Court decision applying binding authority, not a new rule.

How DMD Costs Can Help

We prepare and negotiate claimant clinical negligence costs for solicitor firms: bills of costs, Precedent H budgets, Points of Dispute and Replies, and negotiation to settlement. The fee is fixed and agreed before any work begins.

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